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MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY-"QUASI JUDICIAL" ACTS
Plaintiff, in an action against a municipality for false imprisonment,
alleged that lie was arrested by a municipal police officer pursuant to a
warrant known to be void by the arresting officer and the municipal court
clerk who acted falsely in issuing the warrant. Held: because the acts
alleged were "quasi judicial" in nature, the municipality was not liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Middleton Y. City of Fort
Walton Beach, 113 So.2d 431 (Fla. App. 1959).
The courts uniformly agree that the tortious conduct of a public
officer committed in the exercise of a "judicial" or "quasi judicial"' function
shall not render either the officer or his municipal employer liable.2 The
judiciary of superior and inferior courts are generally accorded immunity
from civil liability arising from judicial acts and duties performed within
the scope of the court's jurisdiction. 8 In many instances, such protection
is also granted to justices of the peace.4 The courts have extended similar
immunity beyond the confines of purely judicial forums by characterizing
as "quasi judicial" the acts and duties of public officials who, though not
members of the judiciary, are permitted or required by law to exercise
their discretion in factual situations ordinarily arising as a common incident
to their basically non-judicial office." The immunity of these officials has
been upheld even though their tortious acts may have been colored by
malicious intent.6 Florida subscribes to this general rule of immunity
as evidenced by the holding in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach7 wherein
the Florida Supreme Court imposed liability on municipal corporations
for the torts of their employees and officers except where the act was
done pursuant to a legislative, quasi legislative, judicial, or quasi judicial
function.8
I. Since the principal case concerns itself only with "quasi-judicial" functions, the
scope of this inquiry shall be similarly restricted.
2. 18 Mc QUILLIN, MUNICIPAIL CORPORATIONS § 53.33 (3d ed. 1950); see, e.g.,
R.chnann v. City of Des Moines, 204 Iowa 798, 215 N.W. 957 (1927). See generally
Anuot,, 13 A.L.R. 1333 (1921).
3. See PROSSER, TORTS § 109 (2d ed. 1955): Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1344, 1360
(1921); e.g., Smith v. Mosier, 148 F. Supp. 638 (W.D. Mich. 1957); JIohnson v. State
oard of Morticians, 288 S.\\W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
4. See Minor v. Seliga, 168 Ohio St. I, 150 N.E.2d 852 (1958); Weil v. Geier,
61 Wis. 414, 21 N.W. 246 (1884); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1344 (1921); Annot., 173
A.L.R. 802 (1948).
5. 67 C.J.S. Officers § 127(a) (1950); see Nebraska Mid-State Reclamation
Dist. v. Hall County, 152 Neb. 410, 41 N.V.2d 397 (1950): Adolph v. Elastic Stop
Nut Corp. of America, 18 N.J. Super. 543, 87 A.2d 736 (1952); People ex rel. Schan
v. Mc\Villiams, 185 N.Y. 92, 77 N.E. 785 (1906); State v. Leyse, 60 S.D. 384, 244
N.W. 529 (1932).
6. PROsSER.1, TORTs § 109 at 781 (2d ed. 1955); see, e.g., Prentice v. Bertken,
50 Cal.App.2d 492, 123 P.2d 96 (1942). But see Iipp v. Farrell, 169 N.C. 551,
86 S.E. 570 (1915).
7. 96 So.2d 130 (FIa. 1957). (tHereafter referred to in text as "Hargrove".)
8. Id. at 133: see Note, 71 tIARV. L. REv. 744 (1958).
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"QUASI JUDICIAL" ACTS.
Certain basic elements are common to the holdings of those cases
wherein the official was held to be acting in a quasi judicial capacity.
First, the element of discretion must be present; the use of discretion
by the officer must be of a type permitted or required by statute.9 Where
the officer's performance is closely restricted by statute to strict adherence
to set tasks and methods in such a way as to preclude any need for
discretion, the function is not considered quasi judicial in character. 10 This
requirement is illustrated by a typical case wherein it was decided that a
State Board of Medical Examiners, in examining applicants for licenses to
practice medicine, by exercising discretion, was acting in a quasi judicial
function."
The element of discretion gives rise to the second element necessary
to the personality of a quasi judicial function: the act must be iithin the
authorized jurisdiction of the office as provided by statute.'2 Therefore,
a justice of the peace has been held liable for issuing an arrest warrant
when he had personal knowledge that no crime was committed. 13 In
Hoppe v. Klapperich," a municipal court judge was held to have acted
wholly without his jurisdiction and in a non-judicial capacity when lie
issued a warrant of arrest without a proper complaint.
In the instant case,' 5 the circuit court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action.' 6 The court's discussion of the applicability
9. E.g., Bryant v. Bryant, 40 Ariz. 519, 14P.2d 712 (1932); Board of Comin'rs
of Atoka County v. Cypert, 65 Okl. 168, 166 Pac. 195 (1917); 50 C.j.S. Judicial
562 (1947).
10. E.g., State ex Tel. Allen v. Rose, 123 Fla. 544, 167 So. 21 (1936); First Nat'l
Bank v. Filer, 107 Fla. 526, 145 So. 204 (1933); Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859,
158 So. 922 (1935); 67 C.J.S. Officers § 112 (1950); David, Tort Liability of Public
Officers, 12 So. CAL. L. REv. 127 (1939).
11. Raaf v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Idaho 707, 84 Pac. 33 (1906);
accord, Appeal of Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262, 280 N.W. 464 (1938); Nash v. Brooks,
276 N.Y. 75, I1 N.E.2d 545 (1937).
12. Brictson v. Voodrough, 164 F.2d 107 (8th Cir, 1947); Broom v. Douglass,
175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860 (1912); Cumow v. Kessler, 110 Mich. 10,- 67 N.W. 982
(1896); Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947); State v. Leyse,
60 S.D. 384, 244 N.W. 529 (1932); Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1344, 1360 (1921); Annot.,
173 A.L.R. 802, 803 (1948).
13. Kaptur v. Kaptur, 50 Ohio App. 91, 197 N.E. 496 (1934).
14. 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
15. Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So.2d 431 (Fa. App. 1959).
16. In the instant case, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that: he was arrested
by a municipal police officer pursuant to a warrant which, though regular on its face,
was void and known to be such by the arresting officer; the complaining witness whose
purported affidavit was the basis for its issuance did not in fact appear before or sign
the affidavit in the presence of the clerk of the municipal court as indicated by hisjurat to the affidavit;- the clerk had personal knowledge of facts which he knew would
result in acquittal of the offense charged; that in executing the jurat to the affidavit
and issuing the warrant the clerk of the municipal court acted falsely and maliciously;
that upon trial of the alleged offense the validity of the affidavit was challenged and
the irregularities admitted by the complaining witness and the clerk, whereupon the
warrant was qushed and plaintiff discharged; the defendant city, acting through its
agents, thereby caused plaintiff to be unlawfully and maliciously deprived of his liberty.
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of Hargrove to intentional torts was ambiguous. 17 However, this issue
was rendered moot by its characterization of the alleged acts as quasi
judicial in nature. The court took cognizance of the self-imposed quasi
judicial exception which was enunciated in the Hargrove case. It should
be noted that the same authority advanced by Hargrove in support of
the quasi judicial exception was similarly advanced in the instant case
as authority for the court's "quasi judicial characterization." This authority
consists of two cases, only one of which, Akin v. City of Miami,18 was
concerned with quasi judicial functions. 9 There, the acts of a municipal
licensing official, because of the requisite use of discretion, were considered
to be quasi judicial. Ignoring the factual distinguishability of the Akin
case from the instant one, the court without any further reasons or
explanations flatly announced that, "The acts involved in the case on
appeal are quasi judicial in character. ' 2 0
While a multitude of cases generally characterize the duties of court
clerks as "ministerial," 2' there is authority to the effect that the taking
of an affidavit in a criminal proceeding is a "judicial" duty. 2 Conceding
the latter view, it would appear that the clerk in the instant case was
functioning in a judicial, or at least a quasi judicial capacity since he
was authorized by statute to take the affidavit a Admitting arguendo the
17. Plaintiff contended that the rationale of the Hargrove case compelled the exten-
sion of the doctrine of respondeat superior to municipal corporations so as to render
them liable for the intentional torts of their employees, agents and officers. The court
seemed to refuse plaintiff's contention in rather vague terms. It is of further interest
to note that the language used in the present case may conceivably lend itself to an
inference that the court refused to interpret the rationale of the Hargrove case asjustifying an extension of liability to cover the intentional tort as well as the negligent
tort. The court referred to the Hargrove holding as expressly limiting the liability of a
municipality to the negligent tort only. However, such an inference does not appear
valid in light of the same court's opinion one year ago in Ragans v. Jacksonville, 106
So.2d 860 (Fla. App. 1958), wherein the members of that appellate court voiced their
belief that municipal tort liability, in view of the Hargrove rationale, cannot be validly
restricted to suits arising out of negligence.
18. 65 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1953). See generally Annot., 55 A.L.R. 430 (1928)(discussing the revocation of license permits as a quasi judicial function).
19. The other case was Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 24, 180 So. 378
(1938).
20. The principal case involved malicious, intentional acts perpetrated by a police
officer and a court clerk which resulted in direct personal injury, as opposed to the
Akin case which concerned the act of a licensing official in the proper exercise of his
discretion and within his jurisdiction as a quasi judicial officer, without any element
of malice or personal injury.
21. 14 C.I.S. Clerks of Courts § 35 (1939); e~g., United States v. Bell, 127 Fed.
1002 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1904); Ex pare larte, 240 Ala. 642, 200 So, 783 (1941); Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. Gregory, 96 So.2d 669 (Fla. App. 1957).
22. 4 ANDERSON, \VIJARroN's CRIMINAl, LAw AND PRocErDRE § 1590 (1957);
accord, [19551 Op. Arr'y GuiN. 055-228 (Fla. 1955).
23. Fi.,s. Srsr. § 168.04 (1957): "The clerk may administer an oath to and take
affidavit of any person charging another with an offense by breach of an ordinance, and
may issue a warrant to the marshal to have the accused person arrested and brought
before the mayor for trial." (Emphasis added.) (ltowever, the Municipal Charter of
Fort Walton Beach, as stated in Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 29092, § 61(b), gives the
municipal judge the power to administer oaths and issue arrest warrants upon proper
affidavits, and requires the warrant to he attested by the clerk. No mention is made of
any authority to be vested in the clerk to issue such warrants by himself.)
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fulfillment of the first element, it would appear that the clerk, by falsely
executing his jurat to an improper affidavit and issuing a warrant on the
basis of that affidavit, acted wholly without his jurisdiction, thereby
negating the "quasi judicial" immunity? 4 Yet despite these blatant irregu-
larities committed by the clerk in the present case, he was still held to
be acting in the exercise of a "quasi judicial function" and recovery from
his municipal employer was forbidden?8 Applying the same prerequisite
elements to the acts of the police officer, it is exceedingly difficult to
find justification for the holding that the municipal police officer was
engaged in a quasi judicial function when he served the void warrant.26
His act completely lacked any display of discretion or personal judgment 27
since he was expressly directed to arrest a particular person, based upon
the explicit mandates of the municipality 28 and the state?9
By arbitrarily employing the term "quasi judicial," the court has
extended the specified exceptions of the Hargrove rule to include public
officers who were never expected or intended to enjoy "quasi judicial
immunity."
EDWIN C, RATINER
24. See Annot., 13 A.L.R. 1334, 1360 (1921); "In order to bring the act of ajudicial officer within the rule granting immunity for acts done in a judicial capacity,
it is essential that the officer shall have issued the warrant on a sufficient affidavit or
complaint properly verified. ."
25. It should be noted that a judgment hy the court declaring one count in the
complaint to be insufficient for failure to state a cause of action would not preclude
recovery on the basis of other counts also alleged in the complaint. FLA. R. Civ, P. 1.8 (g).
26. "The general distinction between ministerial and judicial acts seems to be that,
where the duty to be performed is described by law with such certainty that nothing
is left to the exercise of discretion or judgment, the act is ministerial, but where it
requires discretion or judgment to determine whether the duty to act exists or not,
it is judicial. In other words, the necessity of the exercise of judgment or discretion is
generally held to be the distinguishing test. judged by this test, the service of a summons
is ministerial and not judicial in its nature, for the law plainly describes the duty to be
performed, and the officer is given no discretion as to his right or duty to perform it."
Bryant v. Bryant, 40 Ariz. 519, 14 P.2d 712 (1932). "Arrest under a warrant . . . is
considered a 'ministerial act'." PROSSER, TOrs § 25 (2d ed. 1955).
27. Authorities cited note 9 supra.
28. Referring to the "order" of the court directing the officer to arrest the accused
person.
29. See ADK Ns, FLORIDA CR1IIINAL LAW AND PROcEDITIRE ANNOTATED 257-275
(1954).
